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Abstract 
It is clear that harmful agents are targets of severe condemnation, but it is much less clear how 
perceivers conceptualize the agency of harmful agents. The current studies tested two competing 
predictions made by moral typecasting theory and the dehumanization literature. Across six 
studies, harmful agents were perceived to possess less agency than neutral (non-offending) and 
benevolent agents, consistent with a dehumanization perspective but inconsistent with the 
assumptions of moral typecasting theory. This was observed for human targets (Studies 1-2b, 
and 4-5) and corporations (Study 3), and across various gradations of harmfulness (Studies 3-4). 
Importantly, denial of agency to harmful agents occurred even when controlling for perceptions 
of the agent’s likeability (Studies 2a and 2b) and while using two different operationalizations of 
agency (Study 2a). Study 5 showed that harmful agents are denied agency primarily through an 
inferential process, and less through motivations to see the agent punished. Across all six studies, 
harmful agents were deemed less worthy of moral standing as a consequence of their harmful 
conduct and this reduction in moral standing was mediated through reductions in agency. Our 
findings clarify a current tension in the moral cognition literature, which have direct implications 
for the moral typecasting framework.  
 
Keywords: Harmfulness, Agency, Moral Standing, Dehumanization, Moral Typecasting, Moral 
Cognition 
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Perceiving the agency of harmful agents:  
A test of dehumanization versus moral typecasting accounts  
 
1. Introduction 
There is probably no moral intuition more fundamental and ubiquitous than the rejection 
of cruelty or the infliction of harm for purely selfish reasons (Gert, 2004; Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2009; Greene, 2012; Henrich et al., 2006; Piazza, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014; Pinker, 
2012; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009; Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009; Sousa & Piazza, 2014; Turiel, 
1983). Historically, societies have not always agreed on which actions constitute cruelty or 
which individuals and entities are deserving of protection from such abuses (Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014; Piazza et al., 2014; Singer, 2011). Yet this fact does not negate the core 
intuition that individuals who cause unjustified harm have violated an implicit social contract to 
respect the basic interests of others (Baumard, Andre, & Sperber, 2013; Sousa & Piazza, 2014), 
or the retributive logic that harmful agents are deserving of punishment (Ashworth, 2010; 
Baumard, 2011; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003). 
 A vast literature within psychology supports the idea that harmful agents are targets of 
often severe condemnation (e.g., Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 2013; Bastian, Laham, Wilson, 
Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Gray, 2014; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Vasquez, 
Loughnan, Gootjes-Dreesbach, & Weger, 2014). However, much less research has considered 
the attributions people make with regards to the underlying agency of harmful agents. Currently, 
there are two perspectives on the matter, each with competing predictions. According to moral 
typecasting theory (hereon MTT; Gray & Wegner, 2009), harmful agents should be perceived as 
highly agentive - indeed, as agentive as positive moral actors - and certainly more agentive than 
neutral or non-offending actors (see also Gray, 2010; Gray & Schein, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 
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2011). From this perspective, when a person commits an act of cruelty they are “transformed” 
(Gray, 2010) or “typecasted” (Gray & Wegner, 2009) in the eyes of those bearing witness to 
their actions. The result is that perceivers imbue the target with agency (see Gray, 2010), or, put 
another way, they are attributed the qualities befitting a “moral agent” (see Gray & Wegner, 
2009). Such qualities might include, “self-control, morality, memory, emotion recognition, 
planning, communication, and thought” (Gray & Wegner, 2009, p. 506; see also Gray, Gray, & 
Wegner, 2007).    
From a different perspective, however, harmful agents should not be typecasted as 
agents, but denied agency, as an extension of the human inclination to dehumanize cruel agents 
(Bastian et al., 2013; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013; Viki, 
Fullerton, Raggett, Tait, & Wiltshire, 2012). According to work on dehumanization, harmful 
agents are often seen by others as lacking basic aspects of humanity or “humanness” (Haslam, 
2006; Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008), such as civility and warmth, and at 
times may even be imbued with animalistic or machine- like traits (Bastian et al., 2013; Vasquez 
et al., 2014). Thus, currently, there exists a tension in the psychological literature regarding how 
harmful agents are conceptualized. In the present set of studies, we show that the moral 
typecasting hypothesis that harmful agents are typecasted as agentive fails to hold up to 
empirical scrutiny. Rather than being typecasted as moral agents, we show that harmful agents 
are denied agency, along with other aspects of their humanity.  
1.1 Moral typecasting, dehumanization, and defining agency 
MTT puts forth the provocative claim that agents that inflict harm on others, and, 
likewise, agents who do good deeds for others, are typecasted as “moral agents” and not “moral 
patients,” i.e., they are ascribed the qualities befitting an agent, such as rationality and self-
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control, but not the qualities befitting a patient or victim, such as the capacity to suffer (Gray & 
Wegner, 2009). Conversely, according to MTT, individuals who are victimized are typecasted as 
moral patients, but not as moral agents, and are thus ascribed the qualities befitting a patient, but 
not the qualities befitting an agent. In the present paper we focus empirically on the former half 
of the claim: the typecasting of moral agents as agentive. 
One of the difficulties with interpreting the moral typecasting hypothesis involves the 
various ways in which agency has been operationally defined (for a thorough review, see Piazza 
et al., 2014). In the literature on mind perception, agency is often defined in terms of “higher” 
cognitive capacities, such as being able to reason, communicate, exert self-control, imagine, and 
plan one’s actions (see especially Gray et al., 2007; but also Gray & Schein, 2012; Gray, Waytz, 
& Young, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2012; Haslam et al., 2008; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 
2010). Consistent with the mind perception literature, Sytsma and Machery (2012) 
operationalized agency in terms of higher intelligence, which includes such traits as language, 
creativity, and the capacity for sophisticated culture (e.g., music, poetry). Another perspective 
from social psychology defines agency more broadly in terms of being active, tenacious, 
effective at pursing one’s goals, and having control over one’s environment (Abele, Uchronski, 
Suitner, & Wojciszke, 2008; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Indeed, Gray and Wegner (2009) also 
suggest there are “general” aspects of agency (e.g., being “determined, “powerful”) that might be 
ubiquitous to all agents (see Gray & Wegner, 2009, Study 4b). Thus, there are several 
perspectives on agency and its definition, with research revealing at least two important aspects: 
intelligence (or “cognition” broadly defined) and the capacity for effective goal-directed activity 
(see Piazza et al., 2014).  
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If we turn to the manner in which researchers from MTT have defined agency, we find a 
certain degree of inconsistency in the way agency is defined and operationalized. Gray and 
Wegner (2009) are quite clear that they see the moral typecasting hypothesis as compatible with 
the definition of agency coming from the mind perception literature (see Footnote 1 for one 
illustrative quotation). On the other hand, in their studies Gray and Wegner (2009) assessed 
moral agency using quite a limited set of measures pertaining to intentional action 
(intentionality) and blame and praise (culpability), as opposed to the broader, richer conception 
of agency identified by the mind perception literature (see also Gray & Wegner, 2011). 
Intentionality is only one aspect of agency among many, and, arguably, blame/praise has more to 
do with the potential consequences of perceiving agency rather than the direct possession of 
agency. Nevertheless, it has been concluded on the basis of these limited measures that harmful 
agents (and benevolent agents) are perceived as agentive (see Footnote 2 for illustrative 
quotations). Furthermore, because Gray and Wegner did not assess agency in a comprehensive 
manner it is not at all clear whether perceptions of the actors’ agency within these studies are 
truly responsible for the attribution of blame and intentionality. Some recent research suggests 
attributions of intentionality and blame are, at times, separable from the activity (or inactivity) 
that brought about the harmful outcome (e.g., see Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 2013; Cushman, 
Knobe, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Knobe, 2003). Intentionality merely requires the perception 
that an act is goal directed (i.e., desired and intended; Malle & Knobe, 1997); it does not require 
the attribution of high levels of agency—for example, high levels of rationality, imagination, or 
self-control. Thus, perceivers may at times perceive intentionality despite a deficit of agency on 
the part of the agent, such as when an agent’s thoughtless actions have unintended, harmful 
consequences (Knobe, 2003). Likewise, neither do attributions of blame require high levels of 
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agency (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014); a person can be held morally blameworthy for a 
misdeed without exerting much agency (i.e., planning, rationality, self-control, etc.), such as 
when someone causes harm impulsively (Critcher et al., 2013), without a good reason (Darley, 
Klosson, & Zanna, 1978), or as a side effect of another action (Knobe, 2003). In such cases 
attributions of blame may arise simply as a matter of procedural justice for causing foreseeable 
harm or because the agent’s lack of agency (e.g., lack of rationality or self-control) suggests a 
deficiency in the agent’s character which poses an ongoing threat to others (Critcher et al., 2013). 
It should be noted, however, that low agency may at times serve to mitigate blame as well—for 
example, when the agent is mentally impaired (Christopher & Pinals, 2010; Hart, 1968). Given 
the complex relationship between agency, intentionality, and blame, the use of intentionality and 
culpability as the methodological standard for testing the moral typecasting hypothesis is 
somewhat problematic. A richer and more direct test of the moral typecasting hypothesis would 
be to assess agency traits more comprehensively in terms of the capacity for rationality, 
planning, self-control, imagination, emotion recognition, and so on, after manipulating 
perceptions of the agent’s harmfulness.  
When issues pertaining to the assessment of agency are addressed we can see an 
empirical tension emerging for the moral typecasting hypothesis. The notion that harmful agents 
are typecasted as moral agents appears at odds with the psychological literature on 
dehumanization (e.g., Bastian et al., 2013; Bastian et al., 2011; Haslam et al., 2008; Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014; Viki et al., 2012). This literature suggests that agents who cause others harm 
(e.g., criminals, sex offenders) are often denied important human characteristics, including 
qualities related to agency (e.g., rationality) and patiency (e.g., being emotionally responsive). 
For example, in one study (Bastian et al., 2013), participants read about various types of criminal 
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acts ranging in severity (white-collar crime, violence, child molestation). Then they ascribed the 
actors who committed these crimes various traits largely pertaining to agency and patiency - 
eight traits derived from Bastian and Haslam (2010) having to do with the rationality, 
refinement, and civility of the target (“human uniqueness” traits), or having to do with the 
emotional depth, warmth, and responsiveness of the target (“human nature” traits). The authors 
found that the ascription of human uniqueness and human nature traits decreased proportionate 
to the perceived severity of the offender’s crime. Thus, those who committed more severe crimes 
were denied traits, arguably constitutive of agency and patiency, relative to those who committed 
less severe crimes.  
Why might harmful agents be denied agency? There are at least two plausible 
mechanisms. First, perceivers might infer from the behavior of harmful agents that they lack 
agentive traits, such as rationality, intelligence, or self-control. In other words, the denial of 
agentive traits may be an inference perceivers derive from the harmful behavior displayed by the 
agent. If this is the case, then we should be able to strengthen the denial of agency under 
conditions where we manipulate the rationality of an agent’s motivations for causing harm. 
Specifically, we would expect perceivers to attribute less agency to targets who have less rational 
motivations for causing harm (e.g., causing harm for the fun of it) compared to agents with more 
rational motivations (e.g., causing harm for more utilitarian reasons).  
A second plausible mechanism is moral disengagement (see Bandura, 1999; Castano & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Leidner et al., 2013; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2010). Perceivers may deny agency to harmful agents as a means of 
legitimating any aggressive action taken against the agent as retribution for their crime. From 
this perspective, the denial of agency would aid in preempting any guilt one might experience 
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when retaliating against harmful offenders. Dehumanization in the context of moral 
disengagement has generally been understood as a response to interpersonal or intergroup 
victimization—for example, members of a group may deny the full humanity of a victimized 
group as a means of reducing collective guilt and preserving positive views about the morality of 
one’s own group (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Leidner et al., 2010). Although less work has 
looked at moral disengagement in the context of punishing offenders, it is possible that a 
motivated use of dehumanization might also occur in this context. Since punishment often takes 
the form of aggressive action, incapacitation, or the deprivation of basic rights and freedoms, 
denying offenders full humanity may help legitimate taking action against them. Indeed, the 
study of Bastian et al. (2013), reviewed above, is consistent with a moral disengagement 
perspective (though it is also consistent with an inferential account): the harmful agents (e.g., 
violent offenders) in their study were dehumanized and it was the degree to which the targets 
were dehumanized that predicted the severity of retributive justice directed at them. 
If the moral disengagement hypothesis is correct, then denial of agency to harmful agents 
should be amplified when motivations to see the agent punished are made salient. It follows that 
if people dehumanize harmful agents as a means of legitimating punitive reprisals we would 
expect people to increase their level of dehumanization—including denying them high levels of 
agency—as a function of their desire to see the perpetrator brought to justice.  
1.2 The present studies and hypotheses 
The current research presents six studies that sought to test the competing predictions 
made by moral typecasting theory and the dehumanization literature regarding the manner in 
which lay individuals conceptualize harmful agents, particularly with regards to perceptions of 
their agency. According to MTT, agents who cause others harm should be attributed greater 
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levels of agency than neutral agents (i.e., non-offenders), on par with levels of agency attributed 
to benevolent agents, as this is part of what it means to be typecast as a moral agent. For 
example, Gray (2010, p. 253) writes, “…those who do moral deeds, whether laudable or heinous, 
are perceived as relatively higher in agency and lower in experience (…) those who help or harm 
others not only are perceived to be more agentic but also are permanently ‘typecast’ as such” 
(also see Footnote 3). By contrast, from a dehumanization perspective, harmful agents should be 
attributed less agency than both neutral agents and benevolent agents. Across six studies, we 
contrasted these competing accounts using human targets (Studies 1-2b, and 4-5) as well as a 
non-human target (a corporation; Study 3). We operationalised agency both in terms of mind 
attributions (Gray et al., 2007; Studies 1-5) and traits related to activity level/tenacity (Piazza et 
al., 2014; Study 2a). In Study 2 we ruled out likeability, both statistically (Study 2a) and 
experimentally (Study 2b) as an alternative explanation for why harmful agents are denied 
agency, and, in Studies 3 and 4, we examined agency attributions across several gradations of 
harm. We also investigated, in Study 5, the potential mechanisms (the inferential and 
motivational mechanisms discussed above) involved in the denial of agency to harmful agents. 
As a secondary goal, we sought to determine whether agency denial contributes to 
judgments of the agent’s moral standing (e.g., whether the agent should have its interests 
protected). Past research by Piazza et al. (2014) have found that harmful agents are ascribed less 
moral standing than neutral and benevolent agents. These authors showed that it is the perceived 
harmful character of the target, and not the perceived agency, that influences judgments of moral 
standing at least among non-human animal targets. However, in those studies, agency was 
narrowly defined in terms of the agent’s capacity to effectively act upon and bring about one’s 
goals. Furthermore, the focus was on non-human animals, thus, it remains to be seen whether 
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perceptions of agency, when broadly defined in terms of various mental capacities, might 
mediate the relationship between harmfulness and the moral standing of human targets. We 
might speculate that perceptions of agency play a larger role in the moral evaluations of humans, 
since human beings, as a species, are generally perceived to possess higher base rates of agency 
(see Gray et al., 2007), and thus any downward adjustment of agency will be easier to detect.  
2. Study 1: The Agency of Harmful People 
Study 1 provided an initial test of the competing hypotheses of moral typecasting theory 
and dehumanization theory using human individuals as targets. We manipulated the perceived 
harmfulness of the agent in a between-subjects design (harmful vs. neutral vs. benevolent) and 
had participants rate the target on agency traits, taken from the mind perception literature, and 
form judgments of the target’s moral standing. We predicted, consistent with a dehumanization 
perspective, that harmfulness would reduce judgments of an agent’s moral standing, and that this 
reduction in moral standing would be mediated by attributions of agency.  
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
Participants were 60 American adults (42 male; 18 female; Mage = 30.41 years, SD = 
10.54) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were compensated $.25 and the 
average completion time was two minutes and thirty-two seconds. Recruitment was limited to 
people located in the United States.   
2.1.2 Materials and procedures 
Study 1 manipulated agent category via a vignette methodology in a between-subjects 
design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three agent conditions (harmful; 
neutral; benevolent). In all three conditions, participants first read some filler information about 
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the target: “John is a 23 year old male. He is about six feet tall, with brown hair and blue eyes.” 
Then they read additional information, which varied depending on the agent condition they were 
assigned to: 
 Harmful agent: John has taken to crime. He spends his nights mugging individuals, often 
stealing everything they have and leaving them injured. He also has a girlfriend, but 
cheats on her regularly.  
 
Benevolent agent: John has taken to giving to charity. He spends his nights providing 
food and shelter to individuals. He also has a girlfriend and is very loyal to her. 
 
Participants in the neutral agent condition were told that John was currently working in 
retail. Following the manipulation, participants answered a manipulation check on the perceived 
harmfulness of the agent—five adjectives (α = .97; see Appendix A for a full list of items used 
across studies)—adapted from Piazza et al. (2014, Study 2). Each adjective was rated on a 7-
point scale in terms of ‘‘the extent to which the agent has the following qualities’’ (Not at all to 
Completely). Perceptions of the target’s agency was assessed using seven cognitive trait items 
taken from Gray et al. (2007), for example, “capable of making plans and working towards 
goals” (α = .93). Agreement with these items was rated on a 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly 
agree) scale. Lastly, participants judged the moral standing of the agent using Piazza et al.’s 
(2014, Study 2) 5-item moral standing scale, adapted for use with human targets (e.g., “To what 
extent do you think this person deserves to be protected from harm?” α = .94; all on a 1–7 scale, 
Not at all to Extremely). For one of the moral standing items “kill” was replaced with “steal” to 
soften it. No other measures were collected aside from basic demographics. 
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2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Manipulation check 
The harmfulness manipulation produced a large effect in the expected direction, F(2,56) 
= 91.25, p < .001, η2p = .765. The target was rated as most harmful in the harmful agent 
condition (M = 5.99, SD = 1.08) and least harmful in the benevolent agent condition (M = 1.88, 
SD = 1.01), with the target in the neutral agent condition falling in the middle (M = 3.33, SD = 
.76). All pairwise comparisons were significantly different at p < .001.  
2.2.2 Main analysis and mediation 
Two one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the agency index and, separately, moral 
standing index. There was a large main effect of agent condition on the agency index, F(1,57) = 
39.45, p < .001, η2p = .594. Consistent with a dehumanization effect, John was attributed the 
lowest levels of agency in the harmful agent condition and the highest levels of agency in the 
benevolent agent condition, with the neutral agent condition falling in the middle (see Figure 1 
for means and standard deviations [SDs]). All pairwise comparisons were significantly different 
at p < .003. There was a significant main effect of agent condition on moral standing ratings, 
F(1,55) = 19.86, p < .001, η2p = .428. John was attributed lower moral standing in the harmful 
agent condition (M = 4.02, SD = 1.35) than in the benevolent (M = 6.12, SD = 1.04), p < .001, 
and neutral agent conditions (M = 5.89, SD = .91), p < .001. John was attributed similar levels of 
moral standing in the benevolent and neutral agent conditions, p > .54.  
 
Figure 1  
Attributions of agency to the human target by agent condition (Study 1). Error bars ± 1 SE.  
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We used the PROCESS macro to conduct a mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013), with a 
bootstrapping procedure (5,000 resamples) to construct bias-corrected confidence intervals. The 
bootstrapping procedure showed that, as predicted, the influence of the agent condition (1 = 
benevolent; 2 = neutral; 3 = harmful) on moral standing scores was significantly mediated 
through agency attributions (see Table 1). That is, as the harmfulness of the agent increases the 
target is attributed less agency, which in turn predicts the target’s lower moral standing.   
 
Table 1  
Results of mediation analyses from Studies 1-4. 
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4
4,5
5
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Study 1: Benevolent (= 1) vs. Neutral (= 2) vs. Harmful (= 3) 
Indirect Effect, ab (CI)                           SE 
-.48 (-.85, -.02)                                       .21 
Direct Effect, f (p-value) 
-.63 (.03) 
Study 2a: Benevolent (= 1) vs. Neutral (= 2) vs. Harmful (= 3) 
-.91 (-1.33, -.49)                                     .21 -.22 (.42) 
Study 2b: Benevolent (= 1) vs. Neutral (= 2) vs. Harmful (= 3) 
-.19 (-.44, -.06)                                       .09                    -.64 (.001)                                      
Study 3: Less Harmful (= 1) vs. Moderately Harmful (= 2) vs. Highly    
Harmful (= 3) 
-.08 (-.25, -.01)                                       .06 -.31 (.09) 
Study 4: Neutral (= 1) vs. White-Collar (= 2) vs. Violent (= 3) 
-.82 (-1.23, -.50)                                     .18 -.36 (.18) 
Note. All analyses used a bootstrapping procedure (5,000 resamples) to construct 
95% bias-corrected confidence intervals; bold indirect paths have CIs with values 
non-overlapping with zero. 
 
 
2.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 1 were consistent with the perspective coming from dehumanization 
theory, but contradicted the predictions made by moral typecasting theory. Harmful agents were 
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attributed the lowest levels of agency, followed by the neutral, non-offending agent, while the 
highest levels of agency were attributed to the benevolent agent. Moreover, agent condition had a 
significant indirect effect on the perceived moral standing of the agent via agency ratings. In 
Studies 2a-2b we sought to rule out an alternative explanation (see Footnote 4) that might 
possibly account for the denial of agency to harmful agents, and assessed agency via an alternate 
operationalization (Study 2a).    
3. Study 2: Ruling Out an Alternative Explanation and Testing an Alternate 
Operationalization of Agency  
Study 2 had three objectives. First, we sought to rule out likeability as a possible 
explanation for why harmful agents are denied agency. Harmful agents are generally disliked 
(see Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006; Waytz & Epley, 2012) and this might account for why they 
are attributed lower agency, rather than specifically because of their being harmful. In Study 2a 
we sought to show that likeability cannot completely account for the effects of harmfulness on 
agency attribution by statistically controlling for perceptions of the target’s likeability. In Study 
2b, we addressed the issue of likeability experimentally. Second, we sought to show, in Study 2a, 
that the denial of agency to harmful agents is not limited to the operationalization of agency in 
terms of mind attribution (Gray et al., 2007), but extends also to other definitions of agency 
related to activity level and tenacity. Finally, Study 1 was methodologically limited insofar as the 
agents in the benevolent and harmful vignettes were described as performing a specific action 
while the activity of the agent in the neutral vignette was more abstract. To more tightly 
standardize the activity level of the agents in Study 2 all three targets were described as 
performing a specific action.   
3.1 Study 2a 
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3.1.1 Participants 
We recruited a new sample of 96 adults (62 male; 34 female; Mage = 33.39 years, SD = 
10.37) from the same web service as before, excluding individuals who participated in Study 1 
and restricting the sample to U.S. residents. Participants were compensated $.30 and the average 
completion time was three minutes and twenty-six seconds.   
3.1.2 Materials and procedures 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three agent conditions (harmful; 
neutral; benevolent). In all three conditions, participants first read some filler information about 
the target: “John is a 29 year old man with brown hair and brown eyes. He works as a taxi driver 
in Miami.” Then they read additional information, which varied depending on the agent 
condition they were assigned to. In the harmful agent condition, participants read that at night, 
when John is off work, he likes to spend his time collecting stray cats and dogs to torture and 
experiment on in his basement. In the benevolent agent condition, John was presented as liking 
to spend his time helping out with Meals on Wheels to deliver food to the needy. Finally, 
participants in the neutral agent condition were told that John likes to spend his time practicing 
guitar and writing music (see Appendix B for full vignettes). 
Following the agent manipulation, participants completed the same measures of 
harmfulness (α = .97), agency (α = .89), and moral standing (α = .96) as in Study 1. Agreement 
with these items was rated using the same scale sizes and anchors as in Study 1. Perceptions of 
the target’s likeability was assessed in terms of “how much do you like John” (on a 1-7 scale, 
Not at all to Very much). In addition to administering the same measure of agency as in Study 1, 
perceptions of the target’s agency was assessed using six “activity” traits: tenacious, willful, 
potent, vigorous, active, energetic (α = .76; all on a 1-7 scale, Strongly disagree to Strongly 
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agree). No other measures were collected aside from basic demographics. All participants were 
debriefed and paid. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Manipulation check 
The harmfulness manipulation produced a significant effect in the expected direction, 
F(2,93) = 48.56, p < .001, η2p = .511. The target was rated as more harmful in the harmful agent 
condition (M = 5.85, SD = 1.80) than either in the neutral agent condition (M = 2.60, SD = 1.20), 
p < .001, or in the benevolent agent condition (M = 2.37, SD = 1.71), p < .001, whereas the 
harmfulness of the target in the benevolent and neutral agent conditions was rated equally low, p 
= .56. 
3.2.2 Likeability 
There was a significant main effect of agent condition on likeability, F(2,93) = 77.13, p 
< .001, η2p = .624. John was perceived as less likeable in the harmful agent condition (M = 1.46, 
SD = 1.25) than in the neutral (M = 5.00, SD = 1.28), p < .001, and benevolent agent conditions 
(M = 5.52, SD = 1.75), p < .001, whereas the target was rated equally likeable in the benevolent 
and neutral agent conditions, p = .16. Collapsing across agent condition, ratings of harmfulness 
and likeability were strongly correlated, r(94) = -.90, p < .001. 
3.2.3 Main analysis and mediation 
Collapsing across agent condition, agency and likeability were strongly correlated when 
operationalized in terms of cognitive agency traits, r(94) = .81, p < .001, and moderately 
correlated when operationalized in terms of activity agency traits, r(94) = .29, p = .004. Three 
one-way ANCOVAs were conducted on each of the agency indices (cognitive ability and 
activity traits) and moral standing index, with perceptions of the target’s likeability as a covariate 
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(also see Footnote 5). There was a significant main effect of agent condition on the mind 
perception agency index used in Study 1, F(2,92) = 3.41, p = .037, η2p = .069 (see Figure 2 for 
means and SDs). John was attributed lower levels of agency in the harmful agent condition than 
in the neutral, p = .027, and benevolent agent conditions, p = .012, whereas John was attributed 
similar levels of agency in the neutral and benevolent agent conditions, p = .43. Paralleling the 
results with the cognitive agency traits there was a significant main effect of agent condition on 
the activity agency index, F(2,92) = 8.06, p < .001, η2p = .149. Consistent with a dehumanization 
effect, John was attributed lower levels of agency in the harmful agent condition than in the 
benevolent agent condition, p < .001, and marginally lower levels of agency than in the neutral 
agent condition, p = .097, with the highest levels of agency in the benevolent agent condition 
(see Figure 2 for means and SDs). Finally, no main effect emerged of agent condition on moral 
standing ratings, F(2,92) = 1.30, p = .28 (also see Footnote 6).    
 
Figure 2  
Attributions of agency to the human target by agent condition (Study 2a). Stripe bars = cognitive  
agency traits; dotted bars = activity agency traits. Error bars ± 1 SE. 
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Similar to Study 1, we used the PROCESS macro to conduct a mediation analysis. We 
used a bootstrapping procedure (5,000 resamples) to construct bias-corrected confidence 
intervals. The bootstrapping procedure showed that agent condition had a significant indirect 
effect on judgments of the agent’s moral standing via attributions of agency (see Table 1) 
operationalized in terms of cognitive ability (also see footnote 7). That is, as the harmfulness of 
the agent increased the target was attributed less agency, which in turn predicted the target’s 
lower moral standing.   
3.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 2a were again consistent with a dehumanization perspective, but 
contradicted the predictions made by moral typecasting theory. Harmful agents were attributed 
the lowest levels of agency, while the highest levels of agency were largely attributed to the 
benevolent agent, even when statistically controlling for the agent’s likeability. These findings 
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suggest that likeability cannot completely account for the effect of harmfulness on agency 
attribution. Moreover, denial of agency to harmful agents occurred for both operationalizations 
of agency, whether agency was defined using mind perception items or activity/tenacity items. 
Additionally, agent condition again had a significant indirect effect on the perceived moral 
standing of the agent via agency ratings. In Study 2b we sought to experimentally disentangle 
harmfulness and likeability, as much as possible, to test whether the effects of harmfulness on 
agency are exclusively mediated through likeability.   
3.4 Study 2b 
3.4.1 Participants 
We recruited a new sample of 90 adults (61 male; 29 female; Mage = 31.90 years, SD = 
10.45) from the same web service as before, excluding individuals who participated in the 
previous studies or took part in the same study twice, as well as restricting the sample to U.S. 
residents. Participants were compensated $.50 and the average completion time was eight 
minutes and 47 seconds. 
3.4.2 Materials and procedures 
Three vignettes were devised to tease apart harmfulness and likeability: harmful/likeable; 
neutral/likeable; benevolent/unlikeable. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
vignettes. All participants first read about a man named David, who is a vegetarian. Then they 
read additional information about the activity of the target involving their harming or helping 
others, and, independently, their likeability, which varied by condition (see Appendix B for full 
vignettes). Following the agent manipulation, participants completed a measure of harmfulness 
(six traits: harmful, mean, hostile, peaceful, gentle, caring [positive traits reverse coded]; α = 
.96), and the same agency (α = .88) and moral standing (α = .91) measures as in the previous 
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studies, with agreement with these items rated using the same scale sizes and anchors. The 
likeability of the target was assessed with the item “David is likeable” rated on a 1-7 scale (Not 
at all to Very much so). No other measures were collected aside from basic demographics. All 
participants were debriefed and paid. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Manipulation check 
The harmfulness manipulation produced a significant effect in the expected 
direction, F(2,87) = 93.28, p < .001, η2p = .682. The target was rated as more harmful in the 
harmful/likeable agent condition (M = 5.65, SD = 1.10) than either in the neutral/likeable agent 
condition (M = 2.39, SD = .79), p < .001, or in the benevolent/unlikeable agent condition (M = 
2.79, SD = 1.20), p < .001, whereas the harmfulness of the target in the benevolent/unlikeable 
and neutral/likeable agent conditions was rated equally low, p = .14.  
3.5.2. Likeability 
There was a significant main effect of agent condition on likeability, F(2,86) = 29.84, p 
< .001, η2p = .407. David was seen as less likeable in the harmful/likeable agent condition (M = 
2.58, SD = 1.43), compared to the neutral/likeable (M = 5.32, SD = 1.15), p < .001, and 
benevolent/unlikeable agent conditions (M = 3.76, SD = 1.76), p = .003. That the 
harmful/likeable target was rated less likeable than the benevolent/unlikeable target likely 
reflects the contribution of harmfulness to likeability (collapsing across condition, harmfulness 
and likeability were again negatively correlated, r(88) = -.76, p < .001). Critically, however, 
David was seen as more likeable in the neutral/likeable agent condition than in the benevolent/ 
unlikeable agent condition, p < .001. This shows that harmfulness and likeability are, to an 
extent, separable constructs. 
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 3.5.3 Main analysis and mediation 
Two one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the agency index and moral standing index. 
There was a significant main effect of agent condition on the agency index, F(2,86) = 10.75, p < 
.001, η2p = .200. David was attributed lower levels of agency in the harmful/likeable agent 
condition (M = 4.44, SD = 1.45) than in the neutral/likeable (M = 5.65, SD = .75), p < .001, and 
benevolent/unlikeable agent conditions (M = 5.29, SD = .83), p = .004, whereas David was 
attributed similar levels of agency in the neutral/likeable and benevolent/unlikeable agent 
conditions, p = .20.  
Paralleling the results with the agency index, there was a significant main effect of agent 
condition on the moral standing index, F(2,86) = 17.64, p < .001, η2p = .291. David was 
attributed lower levels of moral standing in the harmful/likeable agent condition (M = 4.46, SD = 
1.54) than in the neutral/likeable (M = 6.03, SD = .82), p < .001, and benevolent/unlikeable agent 
conditions (M = 6.06, SD = 1.15), p < .001, whereas David was attributed similar levels of moral 
standing in the neutral/likeable and benevolent/unlikeable agent conditions, p = .92. 
To test the individual contributions of harmfulness and likeability on attributions of 
agency, we conducted a linear regression with the two factors entered as simultaneous predictors 
of agency. Replicating Study 2a results, harmfulness emerged as a significant predictor of 
agency attributions, β = -.51, t(86) = -3.70, p < .001, likeability did not, β = .07, t(86) = .48, p = 
.63. Finally, we used the PROCESS macro to conduct mediation analyses. We used a 
bootstrapping procedure (5,000 resamples) to construct bias-corrected confidence intervals. The 
bootstrapping procedure showed that agent condition had a significant indirect effect on 
judgments of the agent’s moral standing via attributions of agency (see Table 1). That is, as the 
harmfulness of the agent increased the target was attributed less agency, which in turn predicted 
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the target’s lower moral standing. Importantly, when we conducted a multiple-mediation analysis 
with harmfulness and likeability ratings entered simultaneously as mediators of the effect of 
agent condition on attributions of agency, harmfulness emerged as a significant mediator of 
agency attributions, indirect effect = -.59 (95% bias corrected CIs [-1.06, -.23]), while likeability 
did not, indirect effect = -.01 (95% bias corrected CIs [-.18, .11]).  
3.6 Discussion 
The results of Study 2b were consistent with the results from Study 2a, but this time 
likeability was experimentally manipulated independent from harmfulness. In this study 
harmfulness again significantly reduced attributions of agency, independent from likeability, and 
perceptions of harmfulness mediated the effect independent of likeability as well. Finally, 
harmfulness again had a significant indirect effect on the perceived moral standing of the agent 
via agency ratings. Together the findings of Study 2 suggest that the effect of harmfulness on 
perceptions of agency is not attributable exclusively to the likeability of the agent. In Study 3 we 
sought to replicate our findings using a different agent type – a cigarette corporation – and even 
greater experimental control over the activity level of the agent.   
4. Study 3: The Agency of Harmful Companies  
Past research has shown that corporations are often anthropomorphized and can be 
perceived as intentional agents (Cohen, 2014; Kervyn, Fiske, & Malone, 2012) with distinct 
personalities (Aaker, 1997); furthermore, consumers often exhibit levels of emotional attachment 
towards specific companies and brands (Thomson, MacInnis, & Park, 2005). In Study 3 we 
capitalized on this tendency to treat corporations as intentional agents and sought to replicate the 
findings of Studies 1, 2a, and 2b using an agentive, nonhuman entity. We provided participants 
information about the same agent, a manufacturer of cigarettes, while modifying only the nature 
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of the manufactured product: the harmfulness of the cigarette. This procedure allowed us to 
tightly standardize the activity of the three corporations, while varying only the level of harm 
caused by the agent. To prevent the possibility of familiarity and loyalty effects to an existing 
company, we used a fictional corporate brand.   
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
We recruited a new sample of 98 adults (60 male; 37 female; 1 undisclosed; Mage = 33.18 
years, SD = 10.29) from the same web service as before, excluding individuals who participated 
in the previous studies and restricting the sample to U.S. residents. Participants were 
compensated $.25 and the average completion time was two minutes and thirty-three seconds.    
4.1.2 Materials and procedures 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three agent conditions (highly harmful; 
moderately harmful; less harmful). In the highly harmful agent condition, participants read about 
Initrode, a cigarette company that makes harsh cigarettes that lead to a higher incidence of lung 
cancer. In the less harmful agent condition, Initrode was presented as a cigarette company that 
makes light cigarettes that lead to a lower incidence of lung cancer. Finally, participants in the 
moderately harmful agent condition were provided the same information about Initrode, the 
cigarette company, without mentioning the degree of harmfulness caused by the cigarette or the 
resulting incidence of lung cancer (see Appendix B for full vignettes).   
One thing to note about the moderately harmful and less harmful agent conditions is that 
the agents in these conditions are arguably still causing some harm—though relatively less harm 
than the highly harmful agent—since all three companies are producing cigarettes. This is 
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different from Studies 1, 2a, and 2b where the neutral agent was a non-offender and the 
benevolent agent produced exclusively beneficial outcomes.  
Following the agent manipulation, participants completed the same measures of 
harmfulness (α = .90), agency (α = .86), and moral standing (α = .90) as in Study 1, with 
“Initrode” as the target instead of “John.” Agreement with these items was rated using the same 
scale sizes and anchors as in the previous studies. No other measures were collected aside from 
basic demographics. All participants were debriefed and paid. 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Manipulation check 
The harmfulness manipulation was successful. There was a significant difference in the 
amount of harmfulness perceived across the three companies, F(1,95) = 15.20, p < .001, η2p = 
.242. The highly harmful company was rated as more harmful (M = 5.26, SD = 1.41) than either 
the moderately harmful company (M = 4.07, SD = 1.07), p = .001, or the less harmful company 
(M = 3.59, SD = 1.32), p = .001, whereas the harmfulness of the less and moderately harmful 
companies was rated equally low, p = .15, though there was a non-significant trend to rate the 
less harmful company less harmful than the moderately harmful company.   
4.2.2 Main analysis and mediation  
Two one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the agency index and moral standing index. 
There was a significant main effect of condition on the agency index, F(1,95) = 3.81, p = .026, 
η2p = .076. Pairwise comparisons showed that the less harmful company was attributed higher 
levels of agency than the moderately harmful company, p = .04, and the highly harmful 
company, p < .003 (see Figure 3). The highly harmful company and moderately harmful 
company did not significantly differ in their perceived agency, p = .56. There was a significant 
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main effect of agent condition on moral standing ratings, F(1,95) = 3.84, p = .025, η2p = .076. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that the highly harmful company was attributed lower moral 
standing (M = 4.07, SD = 1.79) than the less harmful company (M = 4.81, SD = 1.13), p = .04, 
and the moderately harmful company (M = 4.96, SD = 1.11), p = .01. The less harmful company 
and moderately harmful company did not significantly differ in their attributed moral standing, p 
= .66.  
Similar to Studies 1-2b, we used the PROCESS macro to conduct a mediation analysis. 
We used a bootstrapping procedure (5,000 resamples) to construct bias-corrected confidence 
intervals. The bootstrapping procedure showed that agent condition had a significant indirect 
effect on judgments of the agent’s moral standing via attributions of agency (see Table 1). The 
highly harmful and moderately harmful corporations were each attributed less agency than the 
less harmful corporation, and this decrease in agency predicted levels of moral standing.     
  
Figure 3  
Attributions of agency to the cigarette company by agent condition (Study 3). The less harmful 
cigarette company produced light cigarettes. Error bars ± 1 SE.  
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4.3 Discussion 
Study 3 replicated the results of Studies 1, 2a, and 2b using a nonhuman entity as the 
harmful agent. The findings were again consistent with a dehumanization perspective and 
inconsistent with predictions made by MTT. The cigarette corporation that produced highly 
harmful cigarettes was denied agency to a greater extent than the company that produced less 
harmful, light cigarettes (with the moderately harmful cigarette company denied agency to a 
similar extent since it arguably still causes considerable harm by virtue of being a cigarette 
manufacturer). As a consequence, the highly harmful corporation was attributed the lowest level 
of moral standing.  
5. Study 4: The Agency and Humanity of Harmful Agents  
In Study 4, we sought to replicate the results of Studies 1-3 using a new set of vignettes 
taken from prior research, while also expanding our assessment of agency beyond the cognitive 
traits used in the mind perception literature. According to several groups of researchers (e.g., 
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Bastian et al., 2011; Haslam et al., 2008; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Waytz et al., 2010), there is 
significant overlap in the agency traits utilized by Gray et al. (2007) and the Human Uniqueness 
traits postulated by Haslam (2006) in his two dimensions of humanness (human nature vs. 
human uniqueness) model of dehumanization. Human uniqueness traits are thought to 
distinguish humans from animals, and involve attributes related to rationality, civility, and 
cultural refinement, whereas human nature traits are traits that are thought to typify human 
beings and distinguish us from inanimate objects—traits such as emotionality, responsiveness, 
and warmth (see Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2008; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Theorists from 
both the mind perception literature (e.g., Waytz et al., 2010) and the dehumanization literature 
(e.g., Haslam & Loughnan, 2014) have speculated that human uniqueness traits have much in 
common with agency traits, though arguably the construct of human uniqueness may be 
somewhat broader. To our knowledge the only study to date that has attempted to assess the 
mind dimension of agency and the humanness dimensions of human uniqueness within the same 
study was conducted by Bastian et al. (2011). However, in their study blame and praise (potential 
consequences of perceiving agency) were used as proxies for agency, rather than assessing 
aspects of agency directly, much like in Gray and Wegner’s (2009) studies. The authors found 
that judgments of blame were influenced more by a target’s level of human uniqueness traits 
(e.g., rationality) than a target’s level of human nature traits (e.g., emotional warmth). Agency 
and human uniqueness may be related constructs, but no study to date, as far as we are aware, 
has included assessments of agency traits and humanness traits within the same study. Study 4 
helps fill this gap.   
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants 
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Eighty-four adult participants (38 male; 46 female; Mage = 35.89 years, SD = 11.58) 
located in the US participated in the study via the same web service as before; individuals who 
participated in the previous studies were excluded. Participants were compensated $.40 and the 
average completion time was four minutes and twenty five seconds.   
5.1.2 Materials and procedures 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three agent conditions (violent 
offender; white collar criminal; neutral agent). The harmful agent vignettes were adapted from 
Bastian et al. (2013). We did not include a benevolent agent in this study, but instead included 
two different levels of harmfulness. In the violent offender and white-collar criminal conditions, 
the same person was described as having committed a violent or a white-collar crime. In the 
neutral agent condition, we simply described an average person who was a teacher (see 
Appendix B for full vignettes). 
The dependent measures were identical to those used in Studies 1-3, with the addition of 
the denial of Human Nature and Human Uniqueness measure taken from Bastian and Haslam 
(2010). The measure is comprised of eight items, four items for each subscale (see Appendix A 
for full list of items). The denial of Human Nature subscale includes items such as: “I felt like 
the person in the story was emotional, like he was responsive and warm” [reverse scored] (α = 
.87). The second 4-item denial of Human Uniqueness subscale included items such as: “I felt like 
the person in the story was rational and logical, like he was intelligent” [reverse scored] (α = 
.90). Agreement with these items was rated on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely so) scale. 
Although the two subscales have been treated separately in past research on intergroup 
dehumanization (Bastian & Haslam, 2010), the scales formed a single dimension in studies by 
Bastian et al. (2013), which focused on harmful offenders. Consistent with this prior research, a 
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principle components analysis with Varimax rotation produced a one-factor solution, explaining 
69.52% of the total variance; the eigenvalue (5.56) for the first factor was the only value 
exceeding the conventional cut-off of 1. For this reason, and because the two subscales when 
combined exhibited a strong internal reliability (α = .93), they were aggregated into a single 
index of denial of humanness. As argued by Bastian et al. (2013), the single-factor solution most 
likely reflects the broad manner in which harmful agents are denied humanness. 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Manipulation check 
There was a large main effect of agent condition on harmfulness ratings, F(1,84) = 
150.43, p < .001, η2p = .788. The violent offender was rated as more harmful (M = 6.41, SD = 
.64) than the white-collar criminal (M = 5.26, SD = 1.03), who was rated more harmful than the 
neutral agent (M = 2.27; SD = 1.09); all pairwise comparisons, ps < .001.  
5.2.2 Main analysis and mediation  
First, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on the agency index. There was a significant 
main effect of agent condition on agency ratings, F(1,77) = 44.04, p < .001, η2p = .534, that was 
again consistent with a dehumanization effect. The most harmful agent (violent offender) was 
attributed the lowest levels of agency (M = 3.60, SD = 1.13), lower than both the white-collar 
criminal (M = 4.14, SD = .92), p = .03, and the neutral agent (M = 5.86, SD = .60), p < .001. 
Additionally, the white-collar criminal was attributed less agency than the neutral agent, p < 
.001. Thus, the results regarding agency attribution were largely consistent with Studies 1-3. 
We also conducted two separate one-way ANOVAs on the denial of humanness and 
moral standing indices. There was a significant main effect of agent condition on the denial of 
humanness index, F(1,80) = 110.24, p < .001, η2p = .734, consistent with the findings of Bastian 
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et al. (2013). The violent criminal was dehumanized (M = 5.65, SD = .83) more so than the 
white-collar criminal (M = 5.00; SD = 1.08), p = .009, and the neutral agent (M = 2.26, SD = 
.72), p < .001. Additionally, the white-collar criminal was dehumanized more than neutral agent, 
p < .001. We also found a significant main effect of agent condition on moral standing ratings, 
F(1,81) = 21.51, p < .001, η2p = .353. The neutral agent was attributed higher moral standing (M 
= 6.33, SD = .73) than the white-collar criminal (M = 4.13, SD = 1.57), p < .001, and the violent 
criminal (M = 3.94, SD = 1.92), p < .001. The violent criminal and the white-collar criminal did 
not significantly differ in their attributed moral standing, p = .65. 
Similar to Studies 1-3, we used the PROCESS macro to conduct a series of mediation 
analyses, first using agency and denial of humanness as separate mediators and secondly treating 
agency and denial of humanness as simultaneous mediators (ratings of agency and denial of 
humanness were significantly correlated, r(80) = -.83, p < .001, tolerance = .303, VIF = 3.30; the 
factor analysis results including agency and denial of humanness items may be found in 
Supplementary Materials). Each analysis used a bootstrapping procedure (5,000 resamples) to 
construct bias-corrected confidence intervals. The bootstrapping procedure provided support for 
the expected mediation model: there was a significant indirect effect of agent condition (1 = 
neutral; 2 = white collar; 3 = violent) on moral standing mediated through agency (see Table 1). 
We also found support for the expected mediation model, indirect effect = -.99 (95% bias 
corrected CIs [-1.51, -.44]), when denial of humanness was entered as the mediator. When 
agency and denial of humanness were treated as simultaneous mediators within a multiple-
mediation analysis, the indirect effect of agent condition on judgments of the agent’s moral 
standing operated via agency attributions, abagency = -.67 (95% bias corrected CIs [-1.22, -.29]), 
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but not through the denial of humanness variable, abdehumanization = -.33 (95% bias corrected CIs [-
.98, .37]).   
5.3 Discussion 
We yet again replicated the finding that agents are denied agency, not attributed agency, 
as a consequence of their harmful actions. Study 4 replicated this dehumanization pattern with 
yet another set of individuals, this time with two gradations of harmful agents: violent offender 
and white-collar criminal. Study 4 also showed that it is the denial of agency in particular (as 
opposed to the denial of humanity broadly construed) that mediates the effect that perceived 
harmfulness has on judgments of the agent’s moral standing.  
6. Study 5: Inferential and Motivational Causes of Agency Denial  
Thus far we have shown that the inferences perceivers form about harmful agents are 
consistent with a dehumanization process and inconsistent with the moral typecasting 
perspective. However we have yet to specify the reasons why perceivers deny harmful agents 
agency in the first place. In Study 5 we sought to investigate two potential mechanisms of 
agency denial: (1) that perceivers infer low levels of agency (rationality, self-control, etc.) from 
an agent’s harmful behavior; and (2) that perceivers are motivated to view the harmful agent as 
lacking agency in order to help legitimate or justify punishing the agent. To test for these two 
potential mechanisms, in Study 5 we independently manipulated in a 2 x 2 between-subjects 
design: (1) the perceived rationality of the offense (rational vs. irrational harm), to test the 
inferential hypothesis; and (2) motivations to see the agent punished (agent harms a loved one vs. 
harms a criminal), to test the motivational hypothesis. We predicted that a rational harmful agent 
would be attributed more agency than an irrational harmful agent, and that an agent that causes 
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harm to a loved one (and thus generates greater retributive justice motivations) would be 
attributed less agency than an agent that causes harm to a criminal.   
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants 
A new sample of 114 adult participants (64 male; 49 female; 1 undisclosed; Mage = 37.71 
years, SD = 13.48) located in the US participated in the study via the same web service as before, 
excluding individuals who participated in the previous studies. Participants were compensated 
$.50 and the average completion time was five minutes and four seconds.   
6.1.2 Materials and procedures 
Design. We used a 2 (rationality of offense: high vs. low) x 2 (motivation to punish 
offender: high vs. low) between-subjects design. All participants read the same initial 
information about the harmful agent: “John is a 23 year old male. He is about six feet tall, with 
brown hair and blue eyes. John has taken to crime.”  
Manipulations. Depending on which motivation condition participants were randomly 
assigned to, they were instructed to further imagine that one day John mugs the participants’ 
mother (high motivation) or a gang member (low motivation). Depending on which rationality 
condition participants were randomly assigned to, John was described as performing the harmful 
act because he needs the money to feed himself (high rationality) or for the fun of it (low 
rationality). See Appendix B for full vignettes by condition. 
Manipulation checks. Participants completed two manipulation checks. First, as a check 
on the perceived rationality manipulation, participants rated how reasonable, rational, sensible, 
and understandable (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely, α = .92) were John’s actions. Second, as a 
check on the motivation to punish manipulation, they rated how strongly they wanted to retaliate 
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against John for the incident, to take revenge on John, and to get even with John (α = .98), all on 
a 1-7 scale (Strongly disagree to Strongly agree).  
Main dependent measures. The measures of agency, dehumanization, and moral standing 
were identical to those used in Study 4. We again submitted the denial of Human Nature and the 
denial of Human Uniqueness subscales to a principle components analysis with Varimax 
rotation. The analysis produced a two-factor solution, explaining 66.75% of the total variance, 
with the eigenvalues for the two factors equal to 4.12 and 1.22. However, these two factors 
largely represented a difference between reverse-coded and non-reverse-coded items and not 
differences in denial of human uniqueness and denial of human nature. Furthermore, a parallel 
analysis suggested that the second factor should be disregarded as a separate factor. For this 
reason, and because the two subscales exhibited strong internal reliability (α = .85), the eight 
items were aggregated into a single index of denial of humanness similar to Study 4.  
We also included in Study 5 for exploratory purposes the patiency or “experience” items 
taken from Gray et al. (2007), with experience/patiency defined broadly in terms of experiential 
cognitive capacities, such as the capacity for consciousness and to experience various emotions 
(e.g., pleasure, pain) and drive states (e.g., hunger). Eleven patiency traits were included in total 
(α = .91; see Appendix A for a full list of items). Agreement with these items was rated on a 1 
(Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) scale. In Gray et al.’s (2007) initial study a factor 
analytic approach was adopted using Varimax rotation that forced orthogonality between 
measures of agency and patiency; however, the raw correlations between the factors were not 
reported. Reanalysis of their data set, as reported by Piazza et al. (2014), revealed quite high 
positive correlations between these dimensions (r = .90). Other research using wider sets of non-
human animal targets have revealed similarly high levels of overlap between Gray et al.’s agency 
THE AGENCY OF HARMFUL AGENTS   36 
 
and experience items (see Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012, Study 1). In the present 
study, the agency and patiency indices were highly correlated, r(108) = .62, p = .001. Since our 
focus in the present study was on agency in particular, we created separate agency and patiency 
indices and assessed these measures separately in the analyses below. The results for patiency 
are reported in Supplementary Materials. Analyses with the patiency items and the agency and 
patiency items combined into a single index may be found in Supplementary Materials as well. 
No other measures were collected aside from basic demographics. 
6.2 Results 
6.2.1 Manipulation checks 
There was a main effect of the rationality manipulation on rationality ratings, F(1,112) = 
8.03, p = .005, η2p = .067. The offense was rated more rational in the high rationality condition 
(M = 2.07, SD = 1.35) than in the low rationality condition (M = 1.45, SD = .96). The rationality 
manipulation did not affect motivations to punish the offender, F(1,111) = .53, p = .47, η2p = 
.005, nor did it interact with the motivation manipulation to affect rationality ratings, F(1,110) = 
1.45, p = .23, η2p = .013, or ratings to see the agent punished, F(1,109) = .01, p = .91, η2p = .000. 
Thus, the rationality manipulation had its intended effect, and this effect was unique to 
rationality ratings.  
There was a main effect of retribution motivation on ratings to see the agent punished, 
F(1,111) = 35.75, p < .001, η2p = .244. Participants’ motivations to see the agent punished were 
higher in the high motivation condition (M = 5.33, SD = 1.84) than in the low motivation 
condition (M = 3.34, SD = 1.70). However, the motivation to punish manipulation also 
incidentally affected perceptions of rationality of the offense, F(1,112) = 4.85, p = .030, η2p = 
.042. The agent whom participants were more motivated to see punished was also perceived to 
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be somewhat less rational (M = 1.51, SD = 1.07) than the agent whom participants were less 
motivated to punish (M = 2.00, SD = 1.29). This incidental effect may reflect a motivated 
attribution process (e.g., see Alicke, 2000), whereby motivations to punish an agent causes 
perceivers to derogate the target in other respects. Thus, while our motivation manipulation was 
successful, and its intended effect was quite large, it also had an incidental effect on rationality 
ratings. 
6.2.2. Preliminary correlations of agency and denial of humanness 
As in Study 4, ratings of agency and denial of humanness were significantly correlated, 
r(109) = -.44, p < .001 (the factor analysis results including agency and denial of humanness 
items may be found in Supplementary Materials). Multicollinearity between these variables was 
not an issue (tolerance = .795, VIF = 1.26); thus, we treated agency and denial of humanness as 
separate dependent measures. 
6.2.3 Main analysis and mediation 
We conducted four separate 2 x 2 ANOVAs on the agency, patiency, denial of 
humanness and moral standing indices.  
Agency. There was a main effect of rationality condition on agency ratings, F(1,108) = 
4.40, p = .038, η2p = .039. As predicted by the inferential hypothesis, the less rational agent was 
attributed lower levels of agency (M = 3.26, SD = 1.41) than the more rational agent (M = 3.79, 
SD = 1.21). However, there was no significant main effect of motivation to punish condition on 
agency ratings, F(1,108) = .14, p = .71, η2p = .001. Additionally, there was no interaction effect 
of rationality and motivation to punish on agency ratings, F(1,106) = 1.99, p = .17, η2p = .018. 
Ratings of the perceived rationality of the offense were also significantly correlated with agency 
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ratings, r(110) = .24, p = .013. Ratings of agency and participants’ motivations to see the agent 
did not correlate, r(109) = -.049 , p = .61. 
Denial of humanness. There was a significant main effect of rationality condition on 
denial of humanness ratings, F(1,109) = 6.04, p = .016, η2p = .053, that was consistent with the 
inferential hypothesis. The less rational agent was dehumanized more (M = 6.14, SD = .87) than 
the more rational agent (M = 5.71, SD = .95). Additionally, there was a significant main effect of 
motivation to punish on denial of humanness ratings, F(1,109) = 7.18, p = .008, η2p = .062, that 
was consistent with the motivational hypothesis. The agent whom participants were more 
motivated to see punished was dehumanized more (M = 6.15, SD = .87) than the agent whom 
participants were less motivated to see punished (M = 5.69, SD = .94). There was no interaction 
effect of rationality and motivation to punish on denial of humanness ratings, F(1,107) = .23, p = 
.633, η2p = .002.  
Moral standing. There was a significant main effect of rationality condition on moral 
standing ratings, F(1,108) = 7.72, p = .006, η2p = .067. The less rational agent was attributed 
lower moral standing (M = 3.80, SD = 1.83) than the more rational agent (M = 4.63, SD = 1.54). 
There was also a significant main effect of motivation to punish condition on moral standing 
ratings, F(1,108) = 16.10, p < .001, η2p = .130. The agent whom participants were more 
motivated to see punished was attributed lower moral standing (M = 3.57, SD = 1.90) than the 
agent whom participants were less motivated to see punished (M = 4.79, SD = 1.34). There was 
no interaction effect of rationality and motivation to punish on moral standing ratings, F(1,108) = 
1.16, p = .28, η2p = .011. 
Mediation. We used the PROCESS macro to conduct a series of mediation analyses, first 
using agency and denial of humanness as separate mediators of the significant effects of 
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rationality and motivation to punish on moral standing (we did not conduct the motivation to 
punish  agency  moral standing mediation analysis since motivation to punish did not 
significantly influence agency ratings), and secondly, treating agency and denial of humanness as 
simultaneous mediators. Each analysis used a bootstrapping procedure (5,000 resamples) to 
construct bias-corrected confidence intervals. The bootstrapping procedure provided support for 
the expected mediation model with regards to rationality  agency  moral standing: there was 
a significant indirect effect of rationality condition on moral standing mediated through agency, 
indirect effect = -.17 (95% bias corrected CIs [-.52, -.01]). There was a significant indirect effect 
of offense rationality on moral standing mediated through denial of humanness, indirect effect = 
-.22 (95% bias corrected CIs [-.52, .04]). We also found support for the indirect effect of 
motivation to punish on moral standing mediated through denial of humanness, indirect effect = 
.22 (95% bias corrected CIs [.06, .50]), but not through agency, indirect effect = .05 (95% bias 
corrected CIs [.-11, .27]).  
When agency and denial of humanness were entered as simultaneous mediators within a 
multiple-mediation analysis, the effect of offense rationality on judgments of moral standing 
operated both through agency (to an extent), abagency = -.13 (95% bias corrected CIs [-.47, .00]), 
and denial of humanness attributions, abdehumanization = -.17 (95% bias corrected CIs [-.49, -.02]). 
By contrast, the motivation to punish influenced judgments of the agent’s moral standing via 
denial of humanness attributions, abdehumanization = .15 (95% bias corrected CIs [.01, .41]), but not 
through agency attributions, abagency = .03 (95% bias corrected CIs [-.12, .25]).  
6.3 Discussion 
Study 5 investigated two separate psychological processes that may help promote the 
denial of agency to harmful agents: an inferential process and a motivational one. However, 
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evidence for the inferential process was relatively clearer, and emerged despite the fact that our 
manipulation of rationality was less potent than our manipulation of retribution motives. Rational 
offenders were ascribed more agency (and were dehumanized less) than irrational offenders, and 
attributions of agency mediated the influence perceived rationality had on moral standing 
judgments. Attributions of humanness also served as an independent mediator of rationality and 
moral standing. By contrast, the motivation to punish manipulation did not affect attributions of 
agency, though it did affect attributions of humanness: motivations to punish the offender led to 
increased dehumanization of the offender, and dehumanization levels mediated the effect of 
punishment motivations on moral standing judgments. Below we discuss possible explanations 
for why our measure of humanness was more sensitive to the motivational variable than our 
measure of agency. 
7. General Discussion 
7.1 Summary of the present studies 
Across six studies, we found evidence consistent with a dehumanization perspective on 
the way lay people conceptualize the agency of harmful agents, evidence that directly contradicts 
assumptions made by moral typecasting theory. In contrast with benevolent and neutral (non-
offending) agents, harmful agents were consistently attributed less agency and, as a consequence, 
were afforded less moral standing (e.g., granted fewer protections and rights). This occurred 
across different intentional agent categories (humans and companies), when we removed the 
confounding influence of agents’ likeability (Studies 2a and 2b), and when controlling the 
specific action of the agent (Study 3). This effect was also observed using two different 
operationalizations of agency (Study 2a), and across different gradations of harmfulness (Studies 
3-4). We also demonstrated that harmful agents are denied agency primarily through the 
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inferences observers draw from the agent’s harmful conduct (and the motivations supporting this 
conduct), and less because of perceivers’ motivations to see the agent punished (Study 5).    
Taken together, the current set of experiments seems to establish a clear challenge to the 
moral typecasting account. While moral typecasting theory (Gray & Wegner, 2009) predicts that 
harmful agents should be attributed levels of agency on par with benevolent agents, by virtue of 
being typecasted as moral agents, and levels of agency certainly higher than neutral, non-
offending agents, the current findings were more consistent with research on dehumanization 
(e.g., Bastian et al., 2013), which predicts that harmful agents should be attributed less agency 
(and overall less humanity traits) than both neutral agents and benevolent agents. The fact that 
harmful agents are denied agency, rather than ascribed agency, directly contrasts with the idea 
coming from MTT that individuals who harm or help others are typecasted as moral agents, and 
thus are ascribed agency-relevant traits (see also Gray, 2010; Gray & Schein, 2012; Gray et al., 
2012; Gray & Wegner, 2011).   
7.2 Theoretical implications, limitations, and future directions 
Our findings have clear implication for the future of moral typecasting theory (Gray & 
Wegner, 2009). At minimum, our results suggest that a reframing of MTT is in order. One 
possibility is that people do typecast some moral agents but not others. For example, we found 
that benevolent agents (humans and companies who perform good deeds) were attributed greater 
agency than non-offending and harmful agents. Thus, the moral typecasting hypothesis may still 
apply, in a more restrictive manner, to perceivers’ conceptualization of good moral agents. 
Another possibility is that the moral typecasting hypothesis may apply when we restrict the 
definition of agency to intentionality and blame. The problem with such a restructuring however 
is that it relies on a limited assessment of agency in terms of intentionality and the potential 
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consequences of perceiving agency (e.g., blame), rather than on a rich and comprehensive 
assessment of the basic manifestations of agency. Arguably, intentionality is a basic feature of 
agency. However, the attribution of intentionality is not limited to harmful agents, but is a feature 
easily conferred on all agents regardless of the content of their actions—harmful, benevolent, 
neutral, or otherwise (see Waytz et al., 2010). Thus, intentionality seems like a poor foundation 
for establishing agency as it applies to moral agents.  
One possibility is that the moral typecasting framework applies to harmful agents only 
with regards to the denial of patiency. Nonetheless, the current findings appear to call into 
question whether it is the typecasting of harmful agents as agentive that causes the reduction in 
patiency, as MTT suggests, or whether the denial of patiency to harmful agents is caused by 
more basic inferences about their emotional callousness (for a similar argument, see Arico, 
2012). Another possibility is that the moral typecasting hypothesis may be limited to a very 
narrow sense of agency that focuses exclusively on power, or the capacity to exert force. Such an 
argument might be made on the basis of work from Gray (2010), who found that getting people 
to think and write about a harmful action performed by a fictional agent led people to exert more 
physical force in a subsequent weight-holding task, compared to a control condition where 
participants thought and wrote about doing some work. (Getting people to think and write about 
a helpful action also led somewhat to increased weight-holding times, compared to control.) The 
results were interpreted as evidence for a moral transformation effect: doing harm or doing good 
(or at least writing about harming or helping) empowers people. It is possible that the moral 
typecasting hypothesis applies in a very narrow sense to feelings of power. Our studies did not 
assess agency narrowly in terms of power, nor did we assess participants’ own feelings of power, 
but had participants make attributions of agency (broadly defined) of other agents. Therefore, 
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there are a number of methodological differences between our studies and Gray’s (2010) study, 
which make direct comparisons impossible. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that perceivers 
would consistently attribute power to harmful agents, vis-à-vis non-offenders, as it seems clear 
that, at least in some situations, it takes more power (i.e., self-control) to stop oneself from 
causing harm than from causing it. Furthermore, in Study 2a we operationalized agency in terms 
of traits very close to the meaning of power (e.g., “potent,” “tenacious”) and replicated the 
dehumanization effect. Moreover, Gray and Wegner (2009, Study 4b) themselves found some 
evidence that harmful and neutral agents are indistinguishable in terms of attributions of power. 
Thus, any reorganization of MTT around the concept of power would have to contend with these 
issues. 
Our findings also contribute to work on dehumanization. First, to the best of our 
knowledge Studies 4-5 are the first to assess Gray et al.’s (2007) mind perception attributes and 
Haslam’s (2006) humanness traits within the same study. Past researchers have theorized that 
there is great overlap in the mind-based agency traits (e.g., planning, emotion recognition, 
imagination) employed within the mind perception literature and the uniquely human traits (e.g., 
rationality, refinement, self-restraint) employed in the dehumanization literature (e.g., see 
Bastian et al., 2011; Haslam et al., 2008; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Waytz et al., 2010). 
Indeed, in the present studies we found moderate to large correlations between agency traits and 
humanness traits. It is worth noting however that the correlations were not consistently large and 
the results of the factor analyses do not support the conclusion that the two constructs are 
identical. Furthermore, the agency traits seemed to correlate not only with uniquely human traits 
(traits like rationality that set humans apart from animals), but also the human nature traits (traits 
like emotionality that set humans apart from machines). Indeed, in our studies both sets of 
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humanness traits tended to form a single factor, which is consistent with past studies by Bastian 
et al. (2013) which focused on harmful agents as targets. Harmful agents, it would seem, are not 
only seen as lacking in rationality, self-restraint, and civility, as well as specific higher order 
cognitive capacities (e.g., planning, imagination), but also are seen as lacking emotionality, 
warmth, and other experience-based traits. In short, harmful agents are seen both in animalistic 
terms (lacking civility, reason, self-restraint) as well as possessing the qualities of machines 
(unfeeling automatons). As a consequence of this, harmful agents are denied the rights and 
protections owed to non-offending individuals: as we observed across all five studies, the denial 
of agency (and other aspects of humanness) to harmful agents mediated judgments of whether 
the agent was owed moral standing.   
Second, the present work highlights two independent mechanisms that help clarify the 
causal process by which harmful agents are denied agency. First, denial of agency and 
humanness appear to be rooted in an inferential process whereby perceivers infer a lack of 
agency by the very fact that the agent inflicts harm on others, in effect reasoning that only an 
irrational, unrestrained, impulsive, uncivilized individual would behave in such a ruthless 
manner. We reasoned that if participants infer the lack of agency from the agent’s harmful 
conduct, then manipulations of the agent’s rationale for causing harm should exaggerate this 
process, as participants draw inferences about the harmful agent’s underlying agency. Indeed, in 
Study 5, this is exactly what we found.   
The second putative mechanism we tested was moral disengagement, a motivational 
process whereby observers may deny an offender agency or humanness in order to justify 
punishing or aggressing towards them (see Bandura, 1999; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; 
Leidner et al., 2013; Leidner et al., 2010). To test this idea, in Study 5 we manipulated 
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participants’ motivations to punish the offender, to see if participants would deny the agent 
agentive qualities even more strongly when motivated to punish the offender. The results 
regarding this moral disengagement process were less clear. Although participants dehumanized 
the harmful agent more when motivated to see him punished, they were no more likely to deny 
the agent agentive traits under increased justice motivations.  
We might speculate that motivations to punish the offender failed to influence 
attributions of agency due to competing motivational forces operating in the process of meting 
out justice. On the one hand, according to moral disengagement theory, when a person is 
motivated to harm someone, they must engage in counter-measures to lessen the potential 
offense of doing so. Dehumanizing the target is one such measure insofar as people feel less 
guilty about harming someone lacking the qualities befitting a human (Bandura, 1999; Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014). On the other hand, the law provides exceptions for individuals who lack 
agency (e.g., children, mentally impaired) when sentencing criminal acts (Christopher & Pinals, 
2010; Fitzgerald, 1962; Hart, 1968; Robinson, 1984). Thus, under motivations to see someone 
punished, it might be in one’s interests to play up an agent’s agentive capacities (e.g., level of 
cognizance). It is quite possible then that inducing motivations to punish a harmful agent causes 
an interaction of opposing strategies whereby the target is at once denied humanness but ascribed 
some level of agency to ensure they are properly held accountable for their actions, while also 
mitigating any guilt one might experience in pursuing punitive action. The fact that our punitive 
motivation manipulation had a stronger effect on our dehumanization measure than on our 
agency measure is somewhat consistent with such an account. Future research could investigate 
this possibility more thoroughly by manipulating the harmful agent’s capacity to understand the 
consequences of his or her actions, independent of motivations to punish the target. Of course, it 
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is also possible that the null effect of punishment motivations on agency attributions is a true null 
effect, thus, research would certainly benefit from future attempts at replication.  
One potential limitation of the current set of studies is that the vignettes we used as study 
materials may lack high levels of psychological realism and thus ecological validity. While the 
nature of our study materials offers considerable experimental control over confounding 
variables, future research should certainly go beyond short, hypothetical scenarios to examine the 
research questions we raise with methodologies that might allow for greater psychological 
realism.  
One other avenue for future research is to examine whether the relationship between 
harmfulness and agency exhibits reverse causality. While the present research demonstrates that 
harmful individuals are ascribed less agency than benevolent and non-offending agents, it leaves 
open the possibility that highly agentive individuals are perceived as less harmful (the reverse 
causal direction). Preliminary support for this idea was found in the results of Study 5.  
Individuals rated the highly rational offender as less harmful (M = 6.16, SD = .69) compared to 
the less rational individual (M = 6.55, SD = .70), F(1,111) = 9.25, p = .003, η2p = .077. The 
inference here might be that rational offenders are more in control of their behavior (e.g., possess 
greater self-restraint) and therefore are less likely to cause inadvertent or incidental harmful 
consequences when executing their intentions. This would be consistent with the results 
observed that rational harmful agents are ascribed higher levels of agency (e.g., self-control) than 
less rational harmful agents. However, future research should test this hypothesis more 
systematically. 
8. Conclusion 
THE AGENCY OF HARMFUL AGENTS   47 
 
Thomas Kuhn wrote, “The proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in 
different worlds.” This research has attempted to unite the worlds of dehumanization and moral 
typecasting and provide a singular empirical test of these competing accounts regarding the 
conceptualized agency of harmful agents. The results demonstrated overwhelming support for a 
dehumanization account, and offered evidence contrary to assumptions made by moral 
typecasting theory. Rather than being typecasted as moral agents, harmful agents were attributed 
less agency than both non-offenders and benevolent agents. This occurs largely due to the 
inferences perceivers draw about the qualities possessed by someone who engages in cruel acts. 
Cruel agents are dehumanized and as a consequence are stripped of basic rights and protections 
generally afforded to all humans. 
  
THE AGENCY OF HARMFUL AGENTS   48 
 
Appendix A. Key Measures from Studies 1-5 
 
Harmfulness Please rate the extent to which you perceive this person as having these qualities: 
Aggressive.  
 Mean.  
 Hostile.  
 Peaceful (reverse coded). 
Gentle (reverse coded). 
 
Moral Standing 
 
How morally wrong do you think it would be for someone to harm this person?  
How morally wrong do you think it would be for someone to steal from this person?  
To what extent do you think this person deserves to be treated with compassion and fairness?  
To what extent do you think this person deserves to be protected from harm? 
If this person was endangered, how important would it be to protect this person?  
 
Agency 
 
 
 
 
Patiency 
 
This person appears to be capable of making plans and working toward goal. 
This person appears to be capable of trying to do the right thing and telling right from wrong. 
This person appears to be capable of remembering things. 
This person appears to be capable of understanding how others are feeling. 
This person appears to be capable of exercising self-restraint over desires, emotions or impulses. 
This person appears to be capable of thought. 
This person appears to be capable of conveying thoughts or feelings to others. 
 
This person appears to be capable of longing or hoping for things. 
This person appears to be capable of experiencing embarrassment. 
This person appears to be capable of feeling afraid or fearful. 
This person appears to be capable of feeling hungry. 
This person appears to be capable of experiencing joy. 
This person appears to be capable of experiencing physical or emotional pain. 
This person appears to be capable of having personality traits that make him unique from others. 
This person appears to be capable of experiencing physical or emotional pleasure. 
This person appears to be capable of experiencing pride. 
This person appears to be capable of experiencing violent or uncontrolled anger. 
This person appears to be capable of having experiences and being aware of things. 
  
Denial of Human 
Nature 
 
 
Denial of Human 
Uniqueness 
 
 
 
Rationality 
 
Motivation to 
Punish 
 
I feel like this person was open minded, like he could think clearly about things (reverse coded). 
I feel like this person was emotional, like he was responsive and warm (reverse coded). 
I feel like this person was superficial, like he had not depth. 
I feel like this person was mechanical and cold, like a robot.  
 
I feel like this person was refined and cultured (reverse coded). 
I feel like this person was rational and logical, like he was intelligent (reverse coded). 
I feel like this person lacked self-restraint, like an animal. 
I feel like this person was unsophisticated. 
 
To what extent would you say this person’s actions are:  
Reasonable; Rational; Sensible; Understandable. 
 
I want to retaliate against this person for the incident. 
I want to take revenge on this person. 
I want to get even with this person. 
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Appendix B. Vignettes Used in Studies 2a-5 
 
Study 2a 
Harmful agent. John is a 29 year old man with brown hair and brown eyes. He works as a taxi 
driver in Miami. At night, when John is off work, he likes to spend his time collecting stray cats 
and dogs to torture and experiment on in his basement.   
 
Benevolent agent. John is a 29 year old man with brown hair and brown eyes. He works as a 
taxi driver in Miami. At night, when John is off work, he likes to spend his time helping out 
with Meals on Wheels to deliver food to the needy. 
 
Neutral agent. John is a 29 year old man with brown hair and brown eyes. He works as a taxi 
driver in Miami. At night, when John is off work, he likes to spend his time practicing guitar 
and writing music. 
 
Study 2b 
Harmful/likeable agent. David is a vegetarian. The reason he is a vegetarian is because he thinks 
humans are no more important than animals. David enjoys it when people who eat meat suffer. 
David sometimes puts extra-spicy hot sauce in people's hamburgers when they aren't looking. 
David’s friends find him quite enjoyable to be around because he has a witty sense of humor and 
playful character. 
 
Benevolent/unlikeable agent. David is a vegetarian. The reason he is a vegetarian is because he 
cares a great deal about animals and it upsets him that animals are killed for their meat when 
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alternative food products are available. David sometimes volunteers at the local animal shelter to 
help care for the animals. David’s friends find him quite annoying to be around because he is 
always trying to get them to change the way they eat. 
 
Neutral/likeable agent. David is a vegetarian. The reason he is a vegetarian is because he doesn’t 
like the smell or taste of meat. David sometimes works at the outlet mall selling perfume and 
cologne. David’s friends find him quite enjoyable to be around because he has a witty sense of 
humor and playful character.  
 
Study 3 
Highly harmful agent. Initrode is a cigarette and tobacco manufacturer. They operate primarily in 
Africa and parts of Southeast Asia. The mix of harsh tobacco and additional chemicals used in 
their products have been linked to a much higher incidence of lung-cancer and heart-disease than 
normal cigarette use.  
 
Less harmful agent. Initrode is a cigarette and tobacco manufacturer. They operate primarily in 
Africa and parts of Southeast Asia. The mix of tobacco and chemicals used in their products 
have been linked to a much lower incidence of lung-cancer and heart-disease than normal 
cigarette use.  
 
Moderately harmful agent. Initrode is a cigarette and tobacco manufacturer. They operate 
primarily in Africa and parts of Southeast Asia. 
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Study 4  
 
Violent offender. Ryan Macey is a 41 year old Caucasian man from Sydney. On a Tuesday 
afternoon, he attempted to hijack a bus carrying 50 passengers by threatening the driver with a 
knife. Macey boarded the bus stopped in traffic, forced the driver off, and told passengers to stay 
put. He failed to start the bus before off-duty Senior Constable John Rider arrived. Macey lunged 
at the officer with a chisel before fleeing towards the Westfield shopping centre, where police 
lost track of him. Ryan was shirtless and seen on TV soon after the crime. He was arrested about 
2.35pm when a resident phoned police saying they had been threatened by a man hiding out in 
their garage, and was found carrying a bum-bag containing a chisel, screwdriver, scissors and a 
20 centimetre blade knife. 
 
White-collar. Ryan Macey is a 41 year old Caucasian man from Sydney. He fleeced almost  
$127,000 from family and friends by stealing money they had given to him for investments. He 
stole this large amount of money from 6 clients between February 2002 and July 2004. He had 
encouraged clients, family and friends to invest in shares, managed investments and 
superannuation funds. Instead of investing the money, Macey transferred the funds into his own 
accounts and used the money for personal expenses. Ryan has been sentenced to 10 month s in 
jail before being released on a five year good behaviour bond. 
 
Neutral. Ryan Macey is a 41 year old Caucasian man from Sydney. He works as a teacher at  
Charles Duncan Elementary School. He has worked there for the past 10 years and is currently 
teaching a grade 7 class. This upcoming Friday, his students will have a math test and so he has 
been focusing primarily on math this week. For the weekend he has plans to catch a play at the 
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local theater.   
 
Study 5 
High rationality/ Low motivation to punish. John is a 23 year old male. He is about six feet tall, 
with brown hair and blue eyes. John has taken to crime. He does this because he needs the 
money to feed himself. Imagine one day he mugs another gang-member, stealing everything he 
had and leaving him injured.  
High rationality/ High motivation to punish. John is a 23 year old male. He is about six feet tall, 
with brown hair and blue eyes. John has taken to crime. He does this because he needs the 
money to feed himself. Imagine one day he mugs your mother, stealing everything she had and 
leaving her injured. 
Low rationality/ Low motivation to punish. John is a 23 year old male. He is about six feet tall, 
with brown hair and blue eyes. John has taken to crime. He does this for fun. Imagine one day he 
mugs another gang-member, stealing everything he had and leaving him injured.  
Low rationality/ High motivation to punish. John is a 23 year old male. He is about six feet tall, 
with brown hair and blue eyes. John has taken to crime. He does this for fun. Imagine one day he 
mugs your mother, stealing everything she had and leaving her injured. 
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Footnotes 
1For example, Gray and Wegner (2009) write, “The perception of humans and other 
entities along distinct dimensions of moral agency and moral patiency has been observed by 
Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007). In this factor analytic study, the authors explored the 
dimensions of mind perception. (…) Participants compared pairs of entities on each of 18 mental 
qualities (e.g., the ability to feel hunger), and analyses of mean judgments revealed a two-
dimensional solution corresponding in key aspects to the constructs of moral agency and moral 
patiency. A dimension termed Experience included many mental qualities indicating moral 
patiency: the abilities to feel hunger, fear, pain, pleasure, rage, and desire; to have personality 
and consciousness; and to feel pride, embarrassment, and joy. A dimension termed Agency 
included characteristics more relevant to moral agency: abilities to have self-control, morality, 
memory, emotion recognition, planning, communication, and thought” (p. 506).   
2 Gray and Wegner (2011, p. 518) write, “Previous moral agents, whether they did good 
or evil, remain typecast as agents for future misdeeds and are punished accordingly” (italics 
added). In discussing the results of studies testing the moral typecasting effects of good and bad 
deeds, Gray (2010) writes, “In Experiment 1, individuals who did good possessed more agency. 
Experiment 2 found that those who imagined themselves doing good or evil were more agentic 
than those who imagined themselves doing something neutral” (p. 257). 
3 It is also clear from the methodology of Gray and Wegner (2009), which included both 
harmful and benevolent moral agents (see Studies 2, 3b, 3c, and 7), that Gray and Wegner 
understand the moral typecasting hypothesis to apply similarly to harmful and benevolent agents 
(see esp. p. 518) “…we looked at responses to a range of good and evil actors, again finding no 
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noteworthy discontinuities in the occurrence of moral typecasting across a range of good and bad 
agents.”. 
4 The authors acknowledge the comments of two anonymous reviewers as to this possible 
alternative explanation underlying the attribution of agency. 
5 While agent condition remained a significant predictor, likeability was also a significant 
predictor of cognitive agency attributions, β = .66, t(93) = 7.69, p < .001, but not of activity 
agency attributions, β = -.09, t(93) = -.69, p = .49. Likeability also predicted judgments of the 
agent’s moral standing, β = .86, t(93) = 8.65, p < .001. 
6 There was a significant main effect of agent condition on moral standing ratings when 
likeability was not used as a covariate, F(2,93) = 19.59, p < .001, η2p = .296. John was attributed 
lower levels of moral standing in the harmful agent condition (M = 3.68, SD = 1.96) than in the 
neutral (M = 5.95, SD = 1.33), p < .001, and benevolent agent conditions (M = 5.88, SD = 1.65), 
p < .001, whereas John was attributed similar levels of moral standing in the neutral and 
benevolent agent conditions, p = .86. 
7 The indirect effect of agent condition on judgments of the agent’s moral standing via 
attributions of agency still holds using a single collapsed measure of agency that includes both 
mind perception and activity traits, indirect effect = -.72 (95% bias corrected CIs [-1.26, -.30]). 
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Supplementary Materials 
Study 4 Supplements 
Factor analysis results from Study 4 including agency and denial of humanness items. 
 We submitted the agency and denial of humanness scales to a principal components 
factor analysis with Varimax rotation. The analysis produced a two-factor solution, explaining 
69.77% of the total variance, with the eigenvalues for the two factors equal to 8.92 and 1.54. The 
first factor (eigenvalue = 8.92) contained most of the denial of humanness items (6 out of 8) and 
three of the agency items (“capable of trying to do the right thing and telling right from wrong”; 
“capable of understanding how others are feeling”; “capable of exercising self-restraint over 
desires, emotions or impulses”). The second factor (eigenvalue = 1.54) contained three agency 
items (“capable of making plans and working toward a goal”; “capable of thought”; “capable of 
remembering things”) and one reverse-coded denial of humanness item (“the person in the story 
was rational and logical, like he was intelligent”). One dehumanization item (“the person in the 
story was unsophisticated”) and one agency item (“capable of conveying thoughts or feelings to 
others”) cross-loaded on the two factors.  
Study 5 Supplements 
Factor analysis results from Study 5 including agency and patiency items. 
We submitted the agency and patiency scales to a principal components factor analysis 
with Varimax rotation, much like in Gray et al.’s original study, using parallel analysis as our 
extraction method. We compared the eigenvalues generated by the parallel analysis with those 
generated by the principal components analysis. This comparison suggested a two-factor 
solution, explaining 58.7% of the total variance. The first factor (eigenvalue = 7.72) contained all 
of the agency items. The second factor (eigenvalue = 2.27) contained all but one of the patiency 
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items; the item “experiencing violent or uncontrolled anger” failed to load on either factor, but 
we included it in our index of patiency since including it did not reduce the overall reliability of 
the scale. One patiency item (“capable of longing or hoping for things”) cross-loaded with the 
agency factor. 
Factor analysis results from Study 5 including agency and denial of humanness items. 
We submitted the agency and denial of humanness scales to a principal components 
factor analysis with Varimax rotation. The analysis produced a three-factor solution, explaining 
67.21% of the total variance, with the eigenvalues for the three factors equal to 6.27, 2.62 and 
1.19. The first factor (eigenvalue = 6.27) contained all but one of the agency items; the item 
“capable of exercising self-restraint over desires, emotions or impulses” cross-loaded on the 
second factor. The second factor (eigenvalue = 2.62) contained three reverse-coded denial of 
humanness items (“this person was emotional, like he was responsive and warm”; “this person 
was refined and cultured”; “this person was rational and logical, like he was intelligent”). The 
third factor (eigenvalue = 1.19) contained three other denial of humanness items (“this person 
was superficial, like he had not depth”; “this person was mechanical and cold, like a robot”; “this 
person was unsophisticated”). One dehumanization item (“this person lacked self-restraint, like 
an animal”) and one agency item (“capable of exercising self-restraint over desires, emotions or 
impulses”) cross-loaded on the two factors. 
Results for patiency from Study 5. 
There was a significant main effect of rationality condition on patiency ratings, F(1,107) 
= 4.05, p = .047, η2p = .036, that was consistent with the results for agency. The less rational 
agent was attributed lower levels of patiency (M = 4.81, SD = 1.20) than the more rational agent 
(M = 5.23, SD = .96). However, there was no significant main effect of motivations to punish on 
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patiency ratings, F(1,107) = .80, p = .37, η2p = .007. Additionally, the rationality and motivation 
manipulations did not interact to affect patiency, F(1,105) = 0.00, p = .99, η2p = .000.   
We ran mediation analyses including patiency as a simultaneous mediator, in addition to 
agency and denial of humanness, of the effects of rationality and, separately, motivations to 
punish, on moral standing judgments. Multicollinearity between patiency and agency (tolerance 
= .619, VIF = 1.62) and patiency and denial of humanness (tolerance = .935, VIF = 1.07) did not 
appear to be an issue. The indirect effect of offense rationality on judgments of moral standing 
operated exclusively through denial of humanness attributions, abdehumanization = -.22 (95% bias 
corrected CIs [-.53, -.05]), and not through agency, abagency = .02 (95% bias corrected CIs [-.21, 
.26]) or patiency, abpatiency = -.15 (95% bias corrected CIs [-.51, .01]). Similarly, the indirect 
effect of motivation to punish condition on judgments of moral standing operated only through 
denial of humanness attributions, abdehumanization = .19 (95% bias corrected CIs [.03, .47]), and not 
through agency, abagency = .01 (95% bias corrected CIs [-.07, .18]) or patiency, abpatiency = .08 
(95% bias corrected CIs [-.04, .35]).  
Main analysis from Study 5 using the overall mind perception index . 
There was a significant main effect of rationality condition on the combined 
agency/patiency index, F(1,110) = 5.80, p = .018, η2p = .050. The less rational agent was 
attributed lower levels of mind (M = 4.20, SD = 1.17) than the more rational agent (M = 4.67, SD 
= .93). However, there was no significant main effect of motivation to punish on the combined 
mind perception index, F(1,110) = .47, p = .47, η2p = .004. Additionally, there was no interaction 
effect of rationality and motivation to punish on the combined mind perception index, F(1,110) = 
.50, p = .48, η2p = .005. 
 
